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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oOo---THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
BOYD

BAGLEY,

CASE NO. 19284

Defenant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley, was tried in the
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah f9r the
crimes of Burglary, Theft and Making a False Report.

The

information charging the defendant with those crimes stems
from a burglary that occurred on September 19, 1982 at a
Rainbo Gas Station at about 33rd South and 31st East in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

A sheriff's deputy, David P. Smith,

arrived at the scene during the burglary and although by his
own statements clearly observed one of the burglars at close
range in good light for several minutes, he was unable to
positively identify the defendant as being the burglar when
given an extensive opportunity to do so only hours later.
The officer did, however, promptly identify the defendant at
trial several months later.

DISPOSITION .!_ti THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley, was tried and
convicted by the court,

the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

presiding, a jury having been waived, of one count of burglary, a third degree felony, one count of theft, a Class B
misdemeanor, taking property of less than $100.00 in value
and of making a false report as to a stolen motor vehicle, a
Class B misdemeanor.

Appellant was sentenced to: serve a

term at the Utah State Prison from 0 to 5 years and fined
$2,000 for the burglary conviction,

that he serve 0 to 6

months in the Salt Lake County Jail and be fined $299.00 for
the theft conviction and also serve a term in the County
Jail of 0 to 6 months and pay a fine of $299.00 for the
false report conviction.

He was further required to make

restitution of an as yet undetermined amount.

The appellant

was granted a stay of execution and placed on probation
under the custody of the court and under the supervision of
the Department of Adult Parole and Probation until further
order of the Court.

Such probation is to be conditioned

upon:

.1.

The usual and ordinary conditions required by

the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
2.

Pay a fine in the amount of $750.00 at a rate

to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
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3.

Pay restitution in an amount and at a rate to

he determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
4.

Enter, participate in and complete the Prison

Diversion Program.
5.

Enter, participate in and complete the program

at the Weber County Alcohol Rehabilitation Program.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
APPELLANT SEEKS REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE
COURT BELOW.
STATEMENT -OF THE
FACTS
--On the night of September 19, 1982 at or about
11:57 p.m.,

Officer Dave Smith of the Salt Lake County

Sheriff's Office was patrolling the area of 3100 East and
33rd South in Salt Lake City.

As he passed a gas station

owned by Rainbo Oil Co., he noticed that there was a white
Ford Courier pick-up truck parked near the north side of the
office building.

After passing the station he noticed that

a window had been broken out on the north side of the
off ice.

He also noticed a male Caucasian in the station

office apparently removing items from the cooler located
along the east wall.

Officer Smith then drove into the

station and parked his vehicle in front of the white pick-up
truck.

As he was getting out of his car to investigate, he
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saw a man leave the office and begin to walk toward the
drivers side of the pick-up truck.

Officer Smith, who

approximately 20 feet from the suspect,
revolver and ordered the man to halt.

drew his service

Lighting conditions

at the time are not known except that Officer Smith stated
that he was close to the suspect and could see him clearly.
The suspect did not stop but continued moving toward the
vehicle,
me".

stating repeatedly "Don't shoot me,

Don't shoot

After the suspect had entered the truck, Officer Smith

approached the passenger side of the small truck and while
reaching inside and grabbing hold of the passenger continued
to order the suspect to halt.

Still the suspect failed to

stop and in fact began to slowly back the truck into the
northeast corner of
holding on
stop.

to

the

station

lot with Officer Smith

the passenger and demanding the driver to

The driver then changed gears and drove from the lot

with Officer Smith still holding the passenger and talking
with the suspect.

The officer somehow became caught on the

truck and was slightly injured as

the truck drove away.

Officer Smith managed to shoot at the right truck tires but
the vehicle drove off.

Officer Smith returned to his patrol

car and radioed the description of the truck to dispatch.
Minutes

later,. Officer Smith learned of an accident

involving a white pick-up truck matching the description of
the truck he had just seen.

He drove to the scene of the
4

dccident,

some four blocks away,

and met Officer Scott

Robinson who had been assigned to investigate the accident.
During that meeting, Officer Robinson showed a Utah Driver's
License

to Officer Smith and Officer Smith quickly

identified the person whose picture was on the license as
being the suspect that he had seen and talked to at the
Rainbo station minutes earlier.

On a second occasion that

morning Officer Smith made a second positive identification
of the suspect as being the person whose photograph was on
the drivers license found in a wallet in the white pick-up
truck.

That license belonged to the defendant,

Boyd D.

Bagley.
Later that afternoon, Officer Smith was on the 9th
floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and noticed
Detective Bringhurst talking to the defendant.

He stood and

watched him for several minutes but could not ·identify him.
Officer Smith continued to observe the defendant for an
additional 30 - 40 minutes,

part of that time watching him

from another room and part of that time in the room with the
defendant listening to him talk to Detective Bringhurst.
Because Officer Smith could not positively identify the
defendant at that time as being the suspect he saw and
talked with some hours earlier,

the defendant was not

arrested and was allowed to leave.
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The defendant was,

however,

later arrested and charged.
ARGUMENT
Point 1

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
Appellant

contends

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to support the judgment and that it would be a
miscarriage of justide for this court to refuse review of
his conviction.
The authority for the reviewing court to reverse a
judgment based on an insufficiency of the evidence is clear
and longstanding.

That standard for finding an insuffi-

ciency of evidence is that:
It must appear

that upon viewing the evidence,

reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed a crime. State

Wilson,

565 P.2d 66, 68 (1977).
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was
also discussed by this court in State

530 P.2d

1272 (1975):
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction, it must appear that viewing the
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably
be drawn upon therefrom, in light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds
could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 530 P.2d at 1272.
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In

11 Ut. 2 d 6 9 , 3 5 5 P. 2 d 5 7

(1960) this court stated:
There is no jury question without substantial
evidence indicating defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, This requires evidence
from which a jury could reasonably find the
defendant guilty of all material issues of
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 355 P.2d
at 59, 11 Ut. 2d at 71.
In State ::!..!... Cooper,

114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764,

(1949), the court said that:
We do not ordinarily interfere with the rulings
of the trial court in either granting or denying a new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure
to exercise discretion on the part of the trial
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of
the trial judge will be sustained. 201 P.2d at
770.
Clearly then, each case must turn upon its own facts as to
whether a new trial is merited due

insufficiency of

evidence.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged.

Again

from the Wilson court,
As to defenses in criminal cases the defendant
has no particular burden of proof except that
the evidence be such as to create a reasonable
doubt of any element of the crime. The burden
is on the State to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and if the evidence with respect
to any defense, e.g., in this instance, alibi, is
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted.
Jn this case it is clear that that State has made
out the crimes charged in Counts 1, 2 and 3, but it is also
7

clear

that

the State has

not

met

its

burden as

to

the

identification of the defendant as the person responsible
for the commission of those crimes.
There may never have been a case wherein a positive
identification should have been more expected than this.
The witness was an experienced officer with some four years
experience with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.

His

testimony (TR 6-25) was that he first observed a Caucasian
male in the
that the

walled office of a Rainbo gas station,
seemed to be well lighted,

In fact, he

could observe the suspect removing items from a cooler.

He

next testifies that after parking his car on the northside
of the office, he saw a suspect leave the office and slowly
walk to the driver's side of a small pick-up truck.

During

this time Officer Smith testifies he saw the man clearly,
being about 20 feet from himself,
man,
halt.

and that he talked to the

was backing away from him, ordering the man to
The suspect while retreating to the drivers' side of

the truck talked to the officer, repeatedly stating "Don't
shoot me, Don't shoot me".

Officer Smith then approached

the passenger side of the truck as it backed into the corner
of the station,

took hold of the passenger's arm and

continued to order the driver to stop.

The officer's testi-

mony is that he got a good look at the suspect's face all
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during this time and that the suspect continued to look at
the officer and plead that he not be shot.

This situation

continued as the driver shifted into drive and pulled out of
the station, having driven a total of some 75 to 150 feet
with the officer talking to and holding him at the point of
a pistol.

Minutes later Officer Smith identifies a drivers

license picture found in the truck as being the same person
that he had just had a confrontation with.

Then some two

hours later, he again identifies the same picture as being
the suspect he had seen so well at the gas station.
However,

later

that

day he happens

defendant in Detective Bringhurst's office.
that

he watched the man for

to

see

the

He testifies

some time but could not

positively identify the defendant as having been the man
that he had held at the point of his pistol some few hours
earlier.

The officer testifies that he observed

the

defendant for some 30 to 40 minutes from outside the office,
from within the office during during the questioning of the
defendant and also

for a

time seated

in another office

watching the defendant through open doors.

When asked by

Detective Bringhurst if he could positively identify the
defendant

as

being

the

suspect

he

observed

at

the

gas

station, he told this detective that he wasn't absolutely
sure (TR. 42).

9

The defendant was released because Officer Smith
could not make a positive identification only a few hours
after he claims to have gotten such a good look at the
suspect.

In fact,

he stated on the morning of the burglary

that the suspect's face was burned into his memory.

Officer

Smith never gave a description of the passenger he claimed
was in the truck at the time of the burglary in spite of his
close proximity to the passenger.

He claims to have held

the passenger's arm for some time during the events of that
late night/early morning encounter.
This kind of faulty memory is not consistent with
the training and experience of this officer and should raise
substantial doubt as to his later positive identification in
court.
POINT
- - I-I
THE IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY OFFICER
BASED ON

SMITH

TAINTED AND SUGGESTIVE OBSERVATION

DURING THE LONG PERIOD THE OFFICER OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT IN
THE DETECTIVE'S OFFICE.
Where a prior tainted observation has ocurred, the
court must determine whether or not
identification is

a

later

in

court

the result of observation during the

commission of a crime of if it has resulted from the tainted
incident.

The United States Supreme Court in
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388 U.S. 218,

18 L.Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926, set out the

following test:
Application of this test in its present context
requires consideration of various factors; for example,
"The
criminal act,

prior

opportunity

to

observe

the

alleged

The existance of any discrepancy between any preline up description and the defendants actual description,
any identification prior to line up of another person,
The identification by picture of the person prior
to line up,
Failure to identify the defendant on a prior
occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and
the line up identification.
It is also relevant to consider those facts-which,
are disclosed concerning the conduct of the line up."
While this case does not involve a line up per se,
the same problem, with a tainted observation, is present.
The Court was concerned with the situation where a witness
is shown a suspect in such circumstances that the witness'
testimony in trial as to the identification of the defendant
is based on the tainted viewing and not on the witnesses
recollection of witnessing the crime itself.
The result of a suggestive or tainted pre-trial
identification has been stated by several courts, among them
the Supreme Court of Arizona

in

Strickland, 556 P.2d 320, 322 (1976).
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the case of

Y.:_

"Ultimately it is the in court identification
that we must be concerned with. If the identification is tainted with a prior identification,
whether made at a suggestive policP line up or
at a suggestive preliminary hearing, the end
result is the same: a high likelihood of
irreparable misidentification and a concurrent
denial of due process of law to the defendant.
Considering the facts of this case and applying the
Wade test,

there can be little doubt

that the in-court

identification of the defendant by Officer Smith was the
result of a suggestive prior encounter.
1)

Officer Smith by his own account had ample

opportunity to observe the

suspect at

the gas station,

indeed, he talked to him for some ti me and came to within 3
to 5 feet of the suspect while the officer was pointing his
pistol at the suspect across the width of a small pick-up
truck.
2)

There is nothing in the record as to any

description of the suspect by Officer Smith, but he does
tell us that he didn't get any description of the passenger
that he alleges he was holding on to.
3)

station,

Officer Smith, after his encounter at the gas

quickly identified the drivers license photograph

taken from the truck as being a picture of the suspect he
had seen at the station,
4)

However, Officer Smith failed to positively

identify the defendant as being the person he had seen and
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talked with only hours earlier.
5)

The period of time between the two events, that

is between the burglary and Officer Smith's observation of
the defendant in Detective Bringhurst's office was in the
nature of hours.

Yet he could not make the identification,

In considering further the extent of the contact
with the defendant, and the natural pressure that Officer
Smith was under to make a positive identification of the
defendant, it is entirely possible and even probable that
during the time Officer Smith was observing the defendant,
he substituted in his mind the identity of the defendant for
the identity of the suspect that he had seen earlier that
morning.
Certainly this prolonged and studied observance of
the defendant and the officer's inability to identify him
at the time would lead the common man to question a positive
identification made months later in court.
positive

Officer Smith's

identification in court was the result of his

suggestive

observation

of

the

defendant,

not

his

recollection of the suspect at the gas station.
POINT
III
--IMPROPER
WEAKNESSES

WEIGHING
OF

THE

BY

THE

JUDGE

STATE'S

CASE

DEFENSE.
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OF

THE

VERSUS

STRENGTHS
THE

AND

DEFENDANT'S

In his closin['. comments, the judge, (TR. 104-106)
seemed to be balancing the State's case against that of the
defendant.
Smith's

He acknowledged the concern he had about Officer

identification at

the Sheriff's Office but

then

mistakenly stated that Officer Smith had made the identification, the testimony of Detective Bringhurst (TR-42) was
that Officer Smith had never made a positive identification
at

the office on September 20,

1982.

Then,

rather

than

considering the reasonable doubt raised by the inability of
Officer Sll)ith to identify the defendant,

the judge raised

slight inconsistencies in the three alibi testimonies.

The

only inconslstencies, however, were at times not material to
the burglary.

All three alibi

testimonies were consistent

within reason during the period of time during which the
burglary was alleged to have occurred.
Again from the WILSON case previously cited:
"The defendant has no burden of proof except
that the evidence be such as to create a
reasonable doubt of any element of the crime.
The burden is on the State to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and if the evidence
with respect to any defense, e.g. in this
instance alibi, is sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt,
he should be acquitted."
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977).
CONCLUSION
Reasonable doubt in this case has been raised in
one area and

supported

by a
14

second

reasonable doubt

in

dfl"Lh<>r area.

The defendant claims an alibi as established

hy three other persons.

This doubt is strengthened by the

1edsonable doubt raised as to identification by Officer
Smith.

His inability to positively identify the defendant

only hours after the officer had an exceptional opportunity
to observe the burglary suspect raises substantial doubt as
to the guilt of the defendant.
For these reasons the trial court erred in allowing
an

adverse

judgment

against

the

defendant

based

on

insufficient evidence, which evidence was tainted by a prior
"identification" and on a failure of the State to meet its
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The judgment should be revised and remanded to the

trial court with directions to enter a judgment of acquital
on all counts.
DATED

day of July, 1983.

RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED BY:

I

_)/ ,-,

.

Attorney for Appellant
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mailed a true and correct

I hereby certify that

copy of the foregoing BRir:F to kic·hdrd D. t1cKelvie, Deputy
County Attorney and
Attorney,

Roger S.

Metro Law Building,

Blaylock,

Deputy County

431 South 300 East, Suite 112,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prcpa id, on the _n day
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